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For nearly twenty years after the Supreme Court’s 1966 ruling in the landmark 
case Miranda v. Arizona,1 whenever criminal suspects were subjected to 
custodial interrogation by law enforcement without first having been advised of 
safeguards to protect their Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the suspects’ 
responses were generally inadmissible at trial.2  However, in its 1984 decision 
New York v. Quarles,3 the Supreme Court announced the public safety 
exception, under which statements made by un-Mirandized suspects can still be 
admissible when the statements were made in response to questions reasonably 
asked to protect the safety of the arresting officers or the general public.4  During 
investigation of terrorism cases, law enforcement agencies have begun to extend 
the time of un-Mirandized questioning of suspects, with the hope that courts will 
find that the public safety exception makes the suspects’ statements admissible 
in the ensuing prosecutions.5 
This Article argues that in announcing the public safety exception, the Court 
implicitly analogized the role of police interrogation in situations implicating 
public safety (which justifies the un-Mirandized questioning and so makes the 
suspects’ responses admissible) to the actions of criminal defendants in 
situations of self-defense and defense of others (justifying the defendants’ 
actions and so avoiding liability for violence).  Recognizing the implicit analogy 
can provide guidance on the applicability and limits of the public safety 
exception and related issues, such as the rescue doctrine.  Moreover, the 
comparison can draw upon the reasoning involved in recognizing battered 
woman syndrome, which has been used to broaden the circumstances under 
which suspects might have reasonably acted in self-defense.  By analogy with 
evaluating the reasonableness of self-defense involving battered woman 
syndrome, evaluating the admissibility of terrorism suspects’ un-Mirandized 
statements under the public safety exception might be influenced by the 
frequency and severity of terrorist activities that took place in the time leading 
up to the arrest of the suspects. 
I.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, THE MIRANDA 
REQUIREMENTS, AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE MIRANDA RULE 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides a privilege against 
self-incrimination, stating in relevant part that no person “shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”6  In 1966, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 469, 654 (1984) (describing the effect of Miranda’s 
holding on statements made in “inherently coercive” circumstances). 
 3. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). 
 4. Id. at 655‒58. 
 5. See David T. Hartmann, comment, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda and the War 
on Terror: Desperate Times Do Not Always Call for Desperate Measures, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R. 
L.J. 219, 234, 241‒44 (2012). 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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decided the Miranda case, which required the use of procedural measures to 
safeguard a suspect’s Fifth Amendment privilege against incriminating himself.7  
The Court explained that when a suspect is subjected to custodial interrogation8 
by law enforcement, 
[he] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any 
questioning if he so desires.9 
The Court also stated that other safeguards may be used for protecting the 
privilege, “so long as they are fully as effective as those described above in 
informing accused persons of their right of silence and in affording a continuous 
opportunity to exercise it.”10 
Failure to administer the Miranda warnings during investigation of a crime 
made the suspect’s statements inadmissible in the ensuing trial.11  Explaining 
why the suspect needs such warnings during pretrial questioning by law 
enforcement, the Court declared that, 
[w]ithout the protections flowing from adequate warnings and the 
rights of counsel, “all the careful safeguards erected around the giving 
of testimony, whether by an accused or any other witness, would 
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling 
possible evidence of guilt, a confession, would have already been 
obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.”12 
Thus, interrogation is not allowed to begin or continue if the suspect indicates 
that he does not wish to be questioned.13  Similarly, if the suspect indicates that 
he wants to speak with an attorney before making a statement to police, 
interrogation cannot begin or continue until the suspect has had the opportunity 
to consult with counsel.14 
                                                          
 7. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478‒79 (1966). 
 8. The Court defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action 
in any significant way.”  Id. at 444. 
 9. Id. at 479.  The Miranda decision referred back to the Court’s previous decision in 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 440.  In Escobedo, the 
Court found the police committed a violation of the Sixth Amendment when they questioned a 
suspect, refused his request to speak with his lawyer, and did not advise him of his right to remain 
silent; accordingly, the Court held that statements the suspect made to the police during the 
interrogation were not admissible against him at the subsequent criminal trial.  378 U.S. at 490‒91. 
 10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490. 
 11. Id. at 444. 
 12. Id. at 466 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
 13. Id. at 445. 
 14. Id. at 444‒45. 
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But in Quarles, the Supreme Court announced a “public safety” exception to 
the Miranda requirements.15  Quarles dealt with circumstances in which a rape 
victim approached police, described her assailant, and stated that he had gone 
into a nearby supermarket while armed with a gun.16  After chasing the suspect 
through the supermarket, an officer stopped him, frisked him, and “discovered 
that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then empty.”17  The officer 
handcuffed the suspect and asked about the gun’s location without first advising 
the suspect of his Miranda rights.18  The Court held that the suspect’s indication 
of the gun’s location among some empty cartons was admissible even though 
the suspect had not been advised of his Miranda rights before making the 
statement.19  The Court also held that the questioning the police undertook 
before advising the suspect of his Miranda rights did not taint the admissibility 
of further statements the suspect made after being advised of his rights.20  The 
Quarles majority concluded that during the act of capturing the suspect, the 
police “were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the 
whereabouts of [the] gun” because the missing gun “obviously posed more than 
one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer 
or employee might later come upon it.”21 
In creating the public safety exception, the Quarles majority emphasized that, 
as a practical matter, arresting officers would probably act from a combination 
of mixed motives, including a desire to safeguard their own safety and that of 
others: “Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in [the arresting officer’s] 
position, would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable 
motives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to 
obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect.”22  The majority then stated that 
                                                          
 15. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655‒56 (1984). 
 16. Id. at 651‒52. 
 17. Id. at 652. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 652, 659‒60. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 657.  However, the dissent contested the majority’s characterization of the facts by 
noting that, “[c]ontrary to the majority’s speculations, . . . Quarles was not believed to have, nor 
did he in fact have, an accomplice to come to his rescue.  When the questioning began, the arresting 
officers were sufficiently confident of their safety to put away their guns.”  Id. at 675 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent further observed that the incident occurred late at night, when “no 
customers or employees were wandering about the store in danger of coming across Quarles’ 
discarded weapon.”  Id. at 676. 
 22. Id. at 656 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).  Thus, in commenting on the Quarles 
decision, one author has asserted that “[a] good analogy to police action in an emergency situation 
is self-defense, where there is no requirement that the actor’s sole motive in employing force be 
self-protection.”  William T. Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 
76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 583 (1985).  Pizzi further notes that, according to the drafters 
of the Model Penal Code, a situation of mixed motives does not invalidate a defendant’s claim of 
self-defense.  Id. at 583 n.113 (discussing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 
1958)). 
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the availability of a public safety exception “does not depend upon the 
motivation of the individual officers involved” and that the situation facing the 
officers was a “kaleidoscopic” one demanding immediate response.23  The 
majority also declared that, “[w]hatever the motivation of individual officers in 
such a situation, we do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda 
require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”24  The 
majority described the public safety exception as a “narrow exception to the 
Miranda rule” and further declared a faith that “police officers can and will 
distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own 
safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit 
testimonial evidence from a suspect.”25 
But in arguing against the creation of the public safety exception, the Quarles 
dissent observed that strict adherence to the Miranda rule would not limit the 
scope of interrogation that law enforcement agents could undertake to protect 
the public: 
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise imminently 
imperiled, the police are free to interrogate suspects without advising 
them of their constitutional rights. . . . [N]othing in the Fifth 
Amendment or our decision in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort 
of emergency questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the 
introduction of coerced statements at trial.26 
Thus, closely applying the Miranda requirements would merely make the results 
of un-Mirandized questioning unavailable for the purpose of prosecuting the 
defendant.27 
The characterization of the precise status of the Miranda requirements has 
changed over time.  In the Miranda case itself, the Court referred to its own 
previous decisions that “recognized both the dangers of interrogation and the 
appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very fact of interrogation 
itself.”28  Apparently picking up on the Miranda decision’s reference to 
“prophylaxis,” the Quarles Court referred to the underlying facts in Quarles as 
“a situation where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to 
the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda.”29  The 
Quarles decision further found that “prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore 
are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but are instead measures 
                                                          
 23. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 658‒59. 
 26. Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 463 (1966). 
 29. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653. 
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to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination is protected.”30  
The Quarles majority therefore concluded that “the need for answers to 
questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety outweighs the need 
for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against 
self-incrimination.”31  But the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States32 declared 
that Miranda did not merely provide prophylactic guidelines, but rather 
“announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede 
legislatively.”33  The Dickerson majority stated that exceptions to the Miranda 
rule—such as the public safety exception created in Quarles—illustrate the 
normal workings of constitutional law as new situations arise.34  Thus, the 
Supreme Court has most recently treated the Miranda requirements as a 
constitutional rule with limited exceptions. 
The public safety exception has applied to the locations of various types of 
weapons and other dangerous objects.  As in the Quarles decision, subsequent 
cases have often applied the exception to situations where the police ask suspects 
about the locations of firearms.35  Courts have also found that the exception 
applies to law enforcement questions about the locations of knives.36  In 
addition, the public safety exception has applied to questioning drug crime 
                                                          
 30. Id. at 654 (citation omitted).  Moreover, the dissent also described the Miranda 
requirements as a “prophylactic barrier” and a “prophylactic rule.”  See id. at 681 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 31. Id. at 657 (majority opinion). 
 32. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 33. Id. at 444. 
 34. Id. at 441.  The other exception noted by the Dickerson majority occurred in Harris v. 
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224, 226 (1971), where the Supreme Court found that a suspect’s un-
Mirandized statements during custodial interrogation were admissible for purposes of impeaching 
the credibility of the suspect’s trial testimony.  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.  During its case in chief, 
the Harris prosecution had not attempted to use the suspect’s statements.  Harris, 401 U.S. at 223‒
24. 
 35. See, e.g., Allen v. Roe, 305 F.3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the public safety 
exception applied when the gun was not at the scene where the crime was committed and also was 
not in the suspect’s possession when he was arrested); United States v. Kelly, 991 F.2d 1308, 1311, 
1313 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the public safety exception applied because, before police 
conducted a consensual pat-down search for drugs, the suspect removed several items—including 
bullets—from his pants pocket, thus raising concern about whether he was carrying a gun). 
 36. See, e.g., People v. Cole, 165 Cal. App. 3d 41, 51‒52 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that, 
having been informed the suspect had a knife that was not found during a pat-down search, the 
arresting officer’s question was “reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety” because “[h]e 
was . . . confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining where the knife was. Until the 
knife was discovered, it posed a threat to public safety.”).  However, the Cole dissent rejected the 
idea that the discarded knife presented a threat to public safety.  See id. at 58‒59 (White, J., 
dissenting).  The dissent further urged that the public safety exception should apply only to the sort 
of circumstances that were present in the Quarles case: “a factual context of a firearm in places of 
public at large accommodation.”  Id. at 58.  See also People v. Waiters, 502 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (explaining that when police arrived, the suspect—without being 
questioned—stated that she stabbed the victim in self-defense; the public safety exception applied 
to the suspect’s identification of the knife’s location in response to police questioning). 
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suspects about whether they are carrying hypodermic needles.37  The public 
safety exception has also applied to questioning suspects about the location of 
bombs or bomb components,38 and to questioning a suspect about the location 
of vials containing bubonic plague bacteria.39 
The suspect’s status as someone involved in actions that typically involve 
possession of dangerous weapons—particularly if he is believed to be a drug 
dealer—has sometimes helped the prosecution establish the applicability of the 
public safety exception.40  However, attempts to invoke the public safety 
exception have failed when courts have found there was no immediate necessity 
to ask the suspect about dangerous items.  For example, the public safety 
exception did not apply to a suspect’s statement about the location of guns in a 
house when law enforcement agents had “performed two sweeps of the house[,] 
. . . had both occupants of the house in handcuffs[,]” and the agents asked only 
about guns inside the house; these facts undercut the prosecution’s argument that 
members of the public outside the house were endangered by the possibility of 
finding the suspect’s firearms.41  Similarly, the public safety exception did not 
apply when officers handcuffed a suspect in a private residence in which it had 
been confirmed no one else was present at the time, the suspect was wearing 
only his underwear, and “[n]umerous officers participated in the arrest, fanning 
out through the apartment.”42  The public safety exception was also inapplicable 
when law enforcement agents arrested a suspect outside his house and 
                                                          
 37. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that the 
public safety exception applied when, before searching the suspect, the police officer asked whether 
“he had any drugs or needles on his person,” and the suspect responded by saying, “‘No, I don’t 
use drugs, I sell them’”).  In Carrillo, the police officer testified that, in previous searches, “he had 
been poked by needles and suffered headaches and skin irritation from contact with illegal drugs.”  
Id. at 1049 n.1. 
 38. United States v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 111, 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the public 
safety exception applied when police officers questioned suspects about pipe bombs found in their 
apartment); United States v. Dodge, 852 F. Supp. 139, 142 (D. Conn. 1994) (concluding that the 
public safety exception applied when a police officer questioned a suspect about the location of 
bomb components that easily could have been assembled). 
 39. United States v. Harris, 961 F. Supp. 1127, 1129‒30, 1134 (S.D. Ohio 1997). 
 40. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 608, 613 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the 
public safety exception applied to the arresting officer’s question about whether weapons were in 
the vicinity; the involved officers reasonably believed they needed the information to protect their 
own safety because the suspect had previously been convicted of assault and was known to be a 
drug dealer, and another individual was at the apartment when the suspect was arrested); United 
States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154‒55 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding that the public safety exception 
applied because the arresting officer reasonably believed that the heroin dealer might be “carrying 
sharp objects or firearms”); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding 
that the public safety exception justified a detective’s question about whether the suspect had a gun 
because “drug dealers are known to arm themselves, particularly when making a sale, in order to 
protect themselves, their goods and the large quantities of cash often associated with such 
transactions”). 
 41. United States v. Brathwaite, 458 F.3d 376, 382‒83 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 42. United States v. Salahuddin, 668 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142‒43 (E.D. Wis. 2009). 
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questioned him about whether there were any traps or explosives inside the 
house; although the agents testified that they had information about the house 
having such dangerous items, they conceded that providing the Miranda 
warnings would not have done harm in that situation, they did not need to enter 
the suspect’s residence immediately, and they did not convey the information 
about the traps and explosives to the officers who entered the residence.43 
Courts are divided about whether the public safety exception applies when the 
risk threatens a specific individual rather than the more general public at large.  
Some have declared that the public safety exception applies in such 
circumstances.44  However, others have stated that the admissibility of a 
suspect’s un-Mirandized statements made in response to officers’ questioning 
aimed at saving specific, identified individuals should be analyzed under a 
separate “private safety exception” or “rescue doctrine” rather than under the 
public safety exception.45  For example, the rescue doctrine may apply to law 
enforcement officers questioning a suspect about the location of a missing 
person whom the police have not yet located.46  Moreover, at least one court has 
held that both the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine apply to 
questions prompted by a concern for the suspect’s own safety.47 
In creating the public safety exception, the Quarles decision emphasized the 
“immediate necessity” of obtaining information from the suspect.48  However, 
subsequent cases have sometimes applied the public safety exception to justify 
the admissibility of a suspect’s statements made in response to law enforcement 
questions asked at a point removed from the immediate place and time of the 
arrest.49  Moreover, the rescue doctrine has been used to justify the admissibility 
                                                          
 43. United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390, 392‒93 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 960 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that the 
public safety exception applied when an officer asked a suspect about the safety of person(s) “inside 
the [suspect’s] house”); Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998, 1000‒02 (Ind. 2002) (internal quotation 
omitted) (holding that the public safety exception applied when an officer asked a suspect about 
the location of a murder victim whose death had not yet been confirmed). 
 45. See, e.g., State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 69, 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (“The companion to 
the public safety exception must be a private safety exception, whether labelled as such or as a 
‘rescue doctrine.’  In our calculus the possible imminent loss of the life of a known and identifiable 
individual is entitled to the same weight as the public safety.”). 
 46. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 123‒24 (Cal. 2009) (concluding that the rescue 
doctrine applied when the suspect was questioned about the location of a kidnapping victim); 
Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d at 71‒72, 76 (determining that the rescue doctrine applied when a suspect was 
questioned about the location of his missing son). 
 47. See Benson v. State, 698 So. 2d 333, 333, 336‒37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that 
the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine applied when the suspect started eating rocks of 
crack cocaine during arrest, police asked how many he had eaten, and an officer labeled the 
situation an “emergency” because of the possibility that the suspect could overdose). 
 48. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984). 
 49. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 702 F.3d 89, 90‒91, 96 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that 
the public safety exception applied when a suspect was arrested outside his apartment building and 
was questioned at the police station “an hour or more after his arrest” because the suspect’s missing 
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of a suspect’s statements in response to custodial interrogation that occurred 
long after the victim was first missing.50  Thus, case law suggests that in at least 
some circumstances, the exceptions to the Miranda rule may apply for an 
extended period rather than only for a short, discrete window of time when 
questioning the suspect. 
II.  CRIMINAL PROCEDURE DRAWING ON CRIMINAL LAW: THE PUBLIC SAFETY 
EXCEPTION IMPLICITLY ANALOGIZES THE ROLE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS WHO INTERROGATE SUSPECTS TO THAT OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 
IN SITUATIONS OF SELF-DEFENSE AND DEFENSE OF OTHERS 
The Quarles majority’s focus on law enforcement officers questioning 
suspects to preserve the officers’ “own safety [and] the safety of others”51 is an 
implicit invocation of the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of 
others.  In order for the public safety exception to justify the use of an un-
Mirandized suspect’s statements, there must have been an “immediate 
necessity” to obtain information from the suspect, and the questions directed to 
the suspect must have been “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public 
safety.”52  Similarly, in the realm of criminal law, one jurisdiction has 
summarized that an actor may “use physical force upon another person when 
and to the extent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself 
or a third person from what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use 
of unlawful physical force by such other person.”53 
The wording of the public safety exception is nearly identical to wording for 
doctrines of self-defense and defense of others.  In formulating the public safety 
exception, the Quarles Court implemented the phrases “immediate necessity”54 
and “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety”55 and referenced 
police officers asking “questions necessary to secure their own safety or the 
safety of the public.”56  This language is very similar to the terms used to 
describe criminal law justifications for use of force in situations of self-defense 
and defense of others: “imminent”57 and “reasonably believes such to be 
necessary to defend himself or a third person.”58  In effect, the Quarles decision 
                                                          
pistol posed a threat, especially in light of the fact that the apartment was close to a playground and 
other public facilities). 
 50. See, e.g., Davis, 208 P.3d at 122‒23 (explaining that the suspect responded to custodial 
interrogation sixty-two days after a kidnapping victim’s disappearance). 
 51. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656. 
 52. Id. at 656‒57. 
 53. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986) (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1) 
(McKinney 2004)). 
 54. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. 
 55. Id. at 656. 
 56. Id. at 659. 
 57. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)). 
 58. Id. 
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imported the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of others into 
the field of criminal procedure.  In criminal law, the doctrines of self-defense 
and defense of others justify conduct that would otherwise result in liability for 
the defendant; likewise, in criminal procedure, the public safety exception 
justifies law enforcement interrogation of a suspect that would otherwise make 
the suspects’ statements subject to the exclusionary rule at trial.59 
A.  Results of Applying Self-Defense and Defense of Others Concepts to the 
Miranda Requirement Exceptions 
Further examining the criminal law doctrines of self-defense and defense of 
others may shed light on the proper contours of the exceptions to the criminal 
procedure Miranda requirements.  Under the right circumstances, a defendant 
can deploy an affirmative defense of necessity for using physical force to defend 
himself or others.60  One may be justified in using physical force in self-defense 
or defense of another person if the actor has a reasonable belief that such force 
is needed to defend against an attacker’s “imminent use of unlawful physical 
force.”61  In addition, the actor must not have been responsible for creating the 
confrontation.62  One court has given the following summary of the necessary 
conditions to support the defendant’s argument of self-defense involving deadly 
force: 
(1) The accused must have had reasonable grounds to believe himself 
in apparent imminent or immediate danger of death or serious bodily 
harm from his assailant or potential assailant; 
(2) The accused must have in fact believed himself in this danger; 
(3) The accused claiming the right of self defense must not have been 
the aggressor or provoked the conflict; and 
(4) The force used must have not been unreasonable and excessive, 
that is, the force must not have been more force than the exigency 
demanded.63 
The public safety exception to the Miranda requirements may apply when law 
enforcement officers question a suspect in a situation that presents an immediate 
threat to the officers’ own safety.64  This is the criminal procedure equivalent to 
the criminal law doctrine of self-defense outlined above: the arresting officers 
                                                          
 59. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 651.  More generally expounding on the relationship between 
criminal law and criminal procedure, one commentator stated that “constitutional criminal 
procedure is a species of substantive criminal law for the police.”  Carol S. Steiker, Counter-
Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure?, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 435, 439 (1997). 
 60. See, e.g., State v. Williford, 551 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (Ohio 1990). 
 61. See, e.g., Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)); Williford, 551 
N.E.2d at 1281 (explaining that one may use force in defense of a family member to the same extent 
that would be justified in a self-defense situation). 
 62. Williford, 551 N.E.2d at 1281. 
 63. Watkins v. State, 613 A.2d 379, 384 (Md. 1992). 
 64. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656. 
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may ask questions to obtain information that is immediately necessary to 
preserving their own safety, and the public safety exception prevents the 
exclusionary rule from making the suspect’s answers inadmissible at trial. 
The public safety exception may also apply when officers question a suspect 
in a situation that poses an immediate danger to the general public.65  Somewhat 
similarly, the rescue doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements applies to 
law enforcement officers’ questioning of a suspect when a specific individual’s 
safety is at risk.66  Together, these situations present a criminal procedure 
analogue to the criminal law doctrine of defense of others that was summarized 
at the start of this subsection: officers may ask questions to obtain information 
that is immediately necessary for dealing with threats to the safety of other 
people, and the public safety exception and the rescue doctrine can prevent the 
exclusionary rule from making the suspect’s answers inadmissible at trial.  In 
summary, as in situations of self-defense or defense of others—where the use of 
force is justified only when the actor reasonably believes there is an imminent 
danger that must be dealt with by force67—the Miranda rule exceptions apply 
only when law enforcement officers encounter an “immediate necessity” to “ask 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”68 
The nature of the suspect’s occupation may play a role in determining whether 
law enforcement officers reasonably believed they needed to protect their own 
safety by asking questions of the suspect.  For example, the public safety 
exception applied when officers arrested and questioned suspects known to be 
drug dealers because such suspects typically carry weapons; therefore, the 
questions were aimed at securing the officers’ own safety.69  The public safety 
exception has also applied to questioning drug crime suspects before searching 
them in order to protect officers from being harmed by implements such as 
hypodermic needles that are common in the use of illegal drugs.70  However, law 
enforcement agents’ assertion of an immediate necessity to protect themselves 
from harm may be undercut if their conduct is inconsistent with that assertion, 
such as when officers asked a suspect about traps or explosives in his house but 
then did not convey the resulting information about such dangerous items to 
officers who entered the house to conduct a search.71 
                                                          
 65. Id. 
 66. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 122‒24 (Cal. 2009); State v. Kunkel, 404 N.W.2d 
69, 76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987). 
 67. See, e.g., Watkins, 613 A.2d at 384; People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986); 
Williford, 851 N.E.2d at 1281. 
 68. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656‒57. 
 69. See, e.g., United States v. Estrada, 430 F.3d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 154 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Edwards, 885 F.2d 377, 384 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Carrillo, 16 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 71. United States v. Rumble, 714 F. Supp. 2d 388, 390, 392‒93 (N.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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B.  Analogizing to Battered Woman Syndrome Could Extend the Range of 
Circumstances to Which the Public Safety Exception Applies 
In a majority of jurisdictions within the United States, expert testimony about 
battered woman syndrome can be admissible as relevant to a defendant’s theory 
of self-defense.72  Less frequently, battered woman syndrome can be invoked in 
support of a defendant’s theory of defense of others.73  A few jurisdictions treat 
battered woman syndrome testimony as relevant to a defense of insanity;74 
however, the insanity defense is not relevant to this Article, so this subsection 
focuses on how battered woman syndrome’s relationship to the concept of self-
defense can contribute to understanding the scope of the Miranda exceptions.  
In particular, analogizing to battered woman syndrome suggests that under some 
circumstances, law enforcement officers might reasonably believe that they face 
an immediate necessity to obtain information from a terrorism suspect, even 
under circumstances that at first glance do not seem to support a finding of 
immediate necessity. 
Battered woman syndrome is a psychological explanation for the conduct of 
some women in abusive relationships, including why someone might remain in 
the relationship rather than leave a partner who physically and psychologically 
                                                          
 72. See generally, e.g., Barrett v. State, 918 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Ambrose v. 
State, No. A-5112, 1995 WL 17220777 (Alaska Ct. App. Apr. 26, 1995); Thompson v. State, 813 
S.W.2d 249 (Ark. 1991); Wonnum v. State, 942 A.2d 569 (Del. 2007); Nixon v. United States, 728 
A.2d 582 (D.C. 1999); Gonzalez-Valdes v. State, 834 So. 2d 933 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); 
Thigpen v. State, 546 S.E.2d 60 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Augustin, 63 P.3d 1097 (Haw. 2002); 
Schwartz v. State, 177 P.3d 400 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); People v. Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1994); State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234 (Iowa 2001); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 
1988); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999); State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); People v. Sandoval-Ceron, No. 286985, 2010 WL 3021861 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Aug. 3, 2010); State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989); Lentz v. State, 604 So. 2d 
243 (Miss. 1992); State v. Martin, 666 S.W.2d 895 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 
474 (Nev. 2000); State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 235 (N.H. 1988); State v. Tierney, 813 A.2d 560 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); State v. Swavola, 840 P.2d 1238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); People v. 
Wilcox, 788 N.Y.S.2d 503 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989); 
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983); State v. Goff, 942 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio 2010); 
Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985 (Or. Ct. App. 
1985); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 
1281 (R.I. 2006); State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121 (S.C. 1986); State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1, 4 
(S.D. 1992); State v. Gurley, 919 S.W.2d 635 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Valdez, No. 
20030089-CA, WL 1017848 (Utah Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2007); State v. Swift, 844 A.2d 802 (Vt. 2004); 
State v. Hendrickson, 914 P.2d 1194 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876 (W. 
Va. 2011); State v. Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994).  See also, e.g., WYO. STAT. 
ANN. § 6-1-203(b) (West 2014). 
 73. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.033(1) (West 2014) (“Evidence that the actor was 
suffering from the battered spouse syndrome shall be admissible upon the issue of whether the actor 
lawfully acted in self-defense or defense of another.” (emphasis added)). 
 74. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-11 (West 2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:14 
(2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 15 (West 2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101 (West 
2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.392 (West 2014). 
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abuses her.75  In particular, “[i]f she tries to leave the relationship, she is located 
and returned and the violence increases.”76  Apparently in recognition that the 
psychological dynamics may also apply to others—not just to women—some 
sources have started to refer to “battered spouse syndrome,”77 although the 
applicability of that term is questionable when the defendant was never married 
to the alleged batterer.78  In addition, at least one court has recognized an 
analogous “battered child syndrome” that may apply to situations in which a 
child defendant presents a claim of self-defense for using physical force against 
a parent.79 
Expert testimony on battered woman syndrome has been offered as relevant 
to evaluating assertions of self-defense undertaken by defendants who 
eventually used physical force—particularly deadly force—against the batterers 
who abused them, rather than leaving the relationship before the conflict 
escalated to such a situation.80  The syndrome is regarded as a form of post-
traumatic stress disorder.81  The theory of battered woman syndrome posits 
recurring cycles consisting of a “tension-building” phase during which the 
battered woman, based on her relationship with the batterer, quickly perceives 
danger signals indicating that a violent episode will occur; an “acute-explosion” 
phase in which the abuse occurs; and a “loving, contrition” phase in which the 
abuser gives assurances of better behavior in the future.82  Battered women tend 
to retaliate against their abusers when “the cycle lapses back into phase one from 
phase three” as signs of violence from the batterer start again.83 
A court has explained that “[e]xpert testimony relating to battered woman’s 
syndrome is germane to the jury’s assessment of the subjective honesty as well 
as the objective reasonableness of a defendant’s belief that deadly force was 
necessary to protect herself against death or serious bodily harm.”84  At trial, “in 
determining objective reasonableness” of the defendant’s belief in the necessity 
of using force, the factfinder “must view the situation from the defendant’s 
perspective.”85  In particular, “[w]here ‘the circumstances’ include domestic 
violence, the battered woman syndrome is relevant to the reasonableness of an 
                                                          
 75. See, e.g., Tierney, 813 A.2d at 564‒65. 
 76. Stewart, 763 P.2d at 582 (citing Gail Rodwan, The Defense of Those Who Defend 
Themselves, 65 MICH. B.J. 64, 66‒67 (1986)) (paraphrasing expert witness testimony). 
 77. See, e.g., Copeland v. Washington, 232 F.3d 969, 975‒76 (8th Cir. 2000); Weiand v. State, 
732 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 1999). 
 78. But see State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 311‒12 (Mo. Ct. App.) (holding that the 
applicability of battered spouse syndrome does not depend on the marital status of the defendant). 
 79. State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1334‒35 (Ohio 1998). 
 80. See Tierney, 813 A.2d at 566. 
 81. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). 
 82. Id. at 10. 
 83. Williams, 787 S.W.2d at 312 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 70 
(1979)). 
 84. Tierney, 813 A.2d at 566 (emphasis added). 
 85. People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1996). 
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individual’s belief” that the batterer presents an imminent danger of “death or 
great bodily harm.”86  A court has noted that commentators have made an 
analogy to a hostage situation, in that “the battered woman lives under long-
term, life-threatening conditions in constant fear of another eruption of 
violence.”87  Thus, a “battered wife is constantly in a heightened state of terror 
because she is certain that one day her husband will kill her during the course of 
a beating. . . . Thus from the perspective of the battered wife, the danger is 
constantly ‘immediate.’”88 
Jurisdictions disagree about whether battered woman syndrome and claims of 
self-defense may justify a defendant’s use of force when the batterer did not 
engage in immediately threatening conduct.  Some courts have held that battered 
woman syndrome may explain why—notwithstanding the apparent absence of 
imminent danger if viewed from an outsider’s perspective—the defendant could 
reasonably believe that the batterer presented an immediate threat.89  Under this 
view, “the issue is not whether the danger was in fact imminent, but whether, 
given the circumstances as she perceived them, the defendant’s belief was 
reasonable that the danger was imminent.”90  But other courts have declared that 
if the batterer did not engage in immediately threatening behavior, then the 
defendant could not have reasonably believed she was in imminent danger, and 
so the justification of self-defense was unavailable.91  Moreover, even if the 
defendant “presents credible evidence that she is a victim of the battered woman 
syndrome,” hiring a third party to kill the batterer makes a claim of self-defense 
unavailable.92 
III.  TERRORISM: POLITICALLY MOTIVATED VIOLENCE 
Terrorism is characterized by violence as a tool of political coercion.  For 
example, the federal terrorism statute contains a requirement of intent that 
defines “[f]ederal crime of terrorism” as “an offense that . . . is calculated to 
influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to 
retaliate against government conduct.”93  The corresponding section of the New  
                                                          
 86. Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 478 (Nev. 2000). 
 87. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK 
ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1986); P. ROBINSON, 2 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES (1984)). 
 88. Id. at 12 n.12 (quoting Loraine Patricia Eber, The Battered Wife’s Dilemma: To Kill or To 
Be Killed, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 895, 928‒29 (1981)). 
 89. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 313‒15 (Wash. 1984) (holding that self-defense 
might apply despite the fact that, after the batterer threatened to kill the defendant, the batterer was 
lying on a couch when the defendant retrieved and loaded a shotgun and killed the batterer). 
 90. Bechtel, 840 P.2d at 12. 
 91. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 575‒76, 578 (Kan. 1988) (holding that self-
defense was inapplicable in the defense of a battered woman who killed her husband when he was 
sleeping). 
 92. People v. Yaklich, 833 P.2d 758, 760 (Colo. App. 1991). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2012). 
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York state terrorism statute provides that: 
[a] person is guilty of a crime of terrorism when, with intent to 
intimidate or coerce a civilian population, influence the policy of a 
unit of government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the conduct 
of a unit of government by murder, assassination or kidnapping, he or 
she commits a specified offense.94 
For federal prosecution of terrorism, a preliminary decision is whether to 
pursue criminal charges in ordinary civilian courts within the United States or 
charge the defendants as accused enemy combatants95 in military commissions 
set up in the U.S. Marine Corps base in Guantanamo, Cuba.96  Civil rights 
guarantees such as Miranda requirements apply more fully in the civilian 
courts,97 and the Obama administration has pursued terrorism prosecutions in 
that setting rather than in military commissions.98 
However, the Obama administration has also been aggressively pursuing the 
use of the public safety exception to justify extended questioning of terrorism 
suspects before advising them of their Miranda rights.99  In 2010, FBI director 
Robert Mueller testified that his agency was interpreting the public safety 
exception broadly when dealing with terrorism cases.100  The FBI also stated this 
policy in an internal memorandum dated October 21, 2010, advising that in 
questioning terrorism suspects, agents should first “ask any and all questions that 
are reasonably prompted by an immediate concern for the safety of the public or 
                                                          
 94. N.Y. Penal Law § 490.25(1) (McKinney 2001). 
 95. For a discussion of the use of due process rights to contest facts allegedly justifying 
detention of a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 
(2004). 
 96. See Hartmann, supra note 5, at 221.  Hartmann’s paper includes empirical data showing 
that the civilian court system is the more effective forum for obtaining convictions in terrorism 
prosecutions.  Id. at 239.  Moreover, the results of trials in the military commission system have 
been notably unimpressive for the prosecution.  Of the cases that went to trial rather than being 
plea-bargained, only two resulted in convictions, and both were subsequently overturned by 
appellate courts.  Jennifer Steinhauer & Charlie Savage, U.S. Defends Prosecuting Benghazi 
Suspect in Civilian Rather than Military Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014, http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/06/18/world/middleeast/us-defends-prosecuting-benghazi-suspect-in-civilian-rather-tha 
n-military-court.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22R 
I%3A13%22%7D&_r=1. 
 97. For this reason, various members of Congress—including Senator Lindsey Graham and 
Congressman Trey Gowdy—have urged that terrorism suspects should be tried by military 
commissions rather than by courts that enforce Miranda rights. Steinhauer & Savage, supra note 
96. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda.html?module=Search&mab 
Reward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D. 
 100. Id. 
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the arresting agents without advising the arrestee of his Miranda rights.”101  
Thus, the memo urged agents to take advantage of what is allowed by the public 
safety exception, to which the memo explicitly later refers.102  The memo stated 
that the complex nature of terrorist attacks justifies “significantly more extensive 
public safety interrogation without Miranda warnings than would be permissible 
in an ordinary criminal case.”103  In particular, the memo advised that 
interrogating un-Mirandized suspects could appropriately include “questions 
about possible impending or coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature, 
and threat posed by weapons that might pos[e] an imminent danger to the public; 
and the identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may 
be plotting additional imminent attacks.”104 
Also in 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder proposed that Congress should 
enact a law to reduce the Miranda requirements when law enforcement agents 
interrogate terrorism suspects.105  Michael McCaul, Chairman of the Homeland 
Security Committee in the House of Representatives, similarly suggested that 
the Miranda requirements should be changed to allow at least forty-eight hours 
for questioning a suspect under the public safety exception.106  But such 
legislative reduction of the Miranda rule would be invalid in light of the 
Supreme Court’s holding in the Dickerson case: “In sum, we conclude that 
Miranda announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede 
legislatively.”107 
A.  The Rescue Doctrine Justifies Extended Interrogation of Un-Mirandized 
Suspects When Specific, Identified Individuals are Threatened 
Straightforward application of the rescue doctrine suggests that law 
enforcement officers may legitimately question un-Mirandized suspects about 
ongoing threats to particular individuals, and that the prosecution may use the 
suspects’ responses at trial.  For example, in the case of People v. Davis,108 the 
California Supreme Court held that the rescue doctrine was applicable to 
interrogation of a kidnapping suspect when the victim had been missing for 
                                                          
 101. The text of the FBI memo was obtained and disclosed by the New York Times in its piece, 
F.B.I. Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25 
miranda-text.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI% 
3A16%22%7D&_r=0. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Charlie Savage, Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/10/us/politics/10holder.html?pagewanted=all&module= 
Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C%7B%222%22%3A%22RI%3A13%22%7D. 
 106. Sabrina Siddiqui, Michael McCaul: ‘Rush to Mirandize’ Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Cost 
Valuable Intelligence, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/ 
04/26/michael-mccaul-mirandize-dzhokhar-tsarnaev_n_3165907.html. 
 107. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). 
 108. 208 P.3d 78 (Cal. 2009). 
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sixty-four days.109  The Davis court explained that such questioning was justified 
because “the length of time a kidnap victim has been missing is not, by itself, 
dispositive of whether a rescue is still reasonably possible.”110  Thus, the 
continuing nature of a threat to an identified individual triggers the rescue 
doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements.  Identifying a specific victim 
or potential victim tends to keep the rescue doctrine within the bounds of what 
is reasonable, rather than degenerating into speculation about a general threat 
that is not specifically directed. 
In the context of handling suspected terrorists, the rescue doctrine should 
support un-Mirandized interrogation to recover kidnapped officials, or to protect 
officials who have been threatened with violence, such as kidnapping or 
assassination.  For example, if law enforcement officers had chosen to conduct 
questioning of un-Mirandized suspects during investigation into the 
assassination plot that targeted then-Senator Obama during his presidential 
campaign in 2008,111 the rescue doctrine could have justified it.  Sometime after 
the suspects were arrested, officials stated that the suspects believed in white 
supremacist ideology and discussed planning to steal guns to engage in “killing 
88 people [(primarily black schoolchildren)] and beheading 14 African-
Americans,” according to an affidavit filed by a federal agent.112  The affidavit 
also explained that the numbers eighty-eight and fourteen have special 
significance “in the white power movement,” being coded references to white 
supremacist slogans.113  The planned killing spree was designed to culminate 
with the assassination of Obama, “the first black presidential nominee from a 
major [political] party.”114  The plan for politically motivated violence that 
included at least one specifically identified individual—a presidential 
candidate—thus constituted a terrorist plan that could justify law enforcement 
agents using the rescue doctrine exception to the Miranda requirements.  The 
rescue doctrine exception could have been used to question the suspects about 
the same sort of items listed in the FBI memo regarding use of the public safety 
exception—coordinated attacks, location of weapons, and “accomplices who 
may be plotting additional imminent attacks.”115  In addition, the specificity of 
the attack plans—such as the particular number of African-American victims to 
be killed and the number to be beheaded—might also be enough to support the 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 123. 
 110. Id. 
 111. For one news source summarizing the plot, see Jack Date, Feds Thwart Alleged Obama 
Assassination Plot, ABC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Vote2008/ 
story?id=6122962. 
 112. Eric Lichtblau, Arrests in Plan to Kill Obama and Black Schoolchildren, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/world/americas/28iht-28plot.17300436.html 
?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 113. Date, supra note 111. 
 114. Lichtblau, supra note 112. 
 115. See F.B.I. Memorandum, supra note 101. 
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idea of a possible ongoing threat to the general public, and thus invoke 
application of the public safety exception, at least until the suspects’ answers 
dispelled the idea of such an ongoing threat. 
B.  By Analogy with Battered Woman Syndrome, the Course of Terrorist 
Activity in the Recent Past Could Be Relevant in Determining Whether the 
Public Safety Exception Applies to Interrogating Terrorism Suspects 
A period of frequent and severe terrorist attacks may justify extending the 
public safety exception, even if the suspect himself has been apprehended and 
does not appear to pose an immediate danger to the public safety.  That situation 
would be analogous to claims of self-defense by sufferers of battered woman 
syndrome in jurisdictions that recognize the syndrome as relevant to determining 
the reasonableness of the actor’s belief that the batterer presented an imminent 
danger. 
An example of the use of battered woman syndrome, in a case where the 
batterer might not have seemed to present an immediate threat, occurred in State 
v. Allery,116 where the Washington Supreme Court determined that expert 
testimony regarding battered woman syndrome should have been admissible in 
support of the defendant’s theory of self-defense for shooting her estranged 
husband.117  Moreover, the court stated that “[t]he jury should have been 
instructed to consider the self-defense issue from the defendant’s perspective in 
light of all that she knew and had experienced with the victim.”118  For a period 
of several years, the defendant was abused by her husband; “[s]he suffered 
periodic pistol whippings, assaults with knives, and numerous beatings from her 
husband’s fists throughout the marriage.”119  He also hit her head with a tire iron, 
and “[d]uring the last year of their marriage, the beatings increased in frequency 
and severity.”120  The defendant started divorce proceedings and obtained a 
restraining order, but when she returned to her house one night, her husband was 
lying on the couch and threatened to kill her.121  The defendant unsuccessfully 
tried to exit through a bedroom window, and she heard a sound that she believed 
indicated her husband was getting a knife in the kitchen.122  She loaded a shotgun 
in the bedroom, moved into the kitchen, and “fired the shot that killed her 
husband while he remained lying on the couch.”123 
Similarly, in State v. Nemeth,124 the Ohio Supreme Court held that evidence 
of battered child syndrome—which is similar to battered woman syndrome—
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 117. Id. at 313‒15. 
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was admissible for several issues, including the defendant’s contention that he 
acted in self-defense when he retrieved a bow and some arrows from his 
bedroom, walked into the hallway, and shot five arrows into his mother’s head 
and neck when she was lying on the living room couch.125  The defendant 
“testified that his mother had been abusive toward him for several years” and 
she frequently engaged in excessive drinking that would result in her hitting him, 
verbally threatening him, and “pounding and kicking on his bedroom door” for 
hours.126  She had also cut him with a coat hanger, burned him with a cigarette, 
used a stick to hit him, and threw objects at him.127  The court reasoned that the 
battered child syndrome evidence was relevant for several purposes, including 
determining whether the defendant “had an honest belief that he was in imminent 
danger, a necessary element in the affirmative defense of self-defense.”128 
Additionally, in State v. Williams,129 the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled that 
the defendant should have been permitted to present a claim of self-defense, and 
that battered woman syndrome evidence was admissible in support of that 
claim.130  As she was leaving from an argument in which her abusive boyfriend 
had hit her, the defendant used her vehicle to strike a man that she mistakenly 
believed to be the boyfriend, and then turned the vehicle around to strike him 
again when she saw him rise to his knees.131  The abuser had beaten the 
defendant between ten and seventeen times during their five-year relationship, 
and had also vandalized the defendant’s furniture and her automobile 
windshield.132  The batterer had also told the defendant that “if she ever hurt him 
she had better kill him, because if she didn’t he would kill her.”133  Based on this 
evidence, the court found that the defendant’s theory of self-defense, based on 
battered woman syndrome, should have been available at trial.134 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals likewise held in Bechtel v. State135 
that testimony about battered woman syndrome should have been admissible at 
the trial of a defendant who claimed self-defense in killing her husband after 
being subjected to “approximately 23 battering incidents” in roughly two 
years.136  The court noted the following incidents, among others: the defendant’s 
husband had pounded her head against the ground and other surfaces, and the 
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defendant was treated at a hospital emergency room on three occasions, 
including one involving a neck injury.137  On the day that the defendant killed 
her husband, he had sexually abused her, “beat her head against the headboard” 
of their bed, and threatened to kill her.138  As described by the court, after the 
defendant was able to move from underneath her husband, she lit a cigarette and 
prepared to smoke it, but then “she heard a gurgling sound, looked up and saw 
the contorted look and glazed eyes of the deceased with his arms raised.”139  The 
defendant then “reached for the gun under the bed” and shot her husband while 
trying to run away from him.140 
A particularly striking use of a theory of self-defense involving battered 
woman syndrome occurred in State v. Leidholm,141 in which the North Dakota 
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a woman who had stabbed her 
husband to death when he was sleeping, and remanded the case for a new trial.142  
The court did not give a detailed account of the abuse that occurred before the 
day of the stabbing, simply stating that “the Leidholm marriage relationship in 
the end was an unhappy one, filled with a mixture of alcohol abuse, moments of 
kindness toward one another, and moments of violence.”143  But on the day of 
the fatal stabbing, the defendant’s husband pushed her down several times both 
inside and outside their house, and he pushed her away from the telephone to 
prevent her from calling law enforcement.144  Later, after defendant and her 
husband went to bed and the husband fell asleep, the defendant went to the 
kitchen, got a knife, and returned to the bedroom where she stabbed him; he died 
minutes later.145  The court held in part that the jury instruction about self-
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defense was faulty because it referred to “reasonably prudent persons, regardless 
of their sex, similarly situated” to determine whether the defendant had “the 
reasonable belief that the other person was then about to kill her or do serious 
bodily harm to her.”146  The court explained that under North Dakota law, the 
applicable standard was not that of “a reasonably cautious person,” but rather 
“what [the defendant] in good faith honestly believed and had reasonable ground 
to believe was necessary for h[er] to do to protect h[er]self from apprehended 
death or great bodily injury.”147  Thus, the jury should have taken into account 
“the unique physical and psychological characteristics of an accused” in 
determining whether the defendant acted reasonably.148 
Each of these cases in which the defendants claimed self-defense featured 
traumatic incidents that a batterer inflicted upon the defendant for an extended 
period of time leading up to the defendant’s use of deadly force.  Each case 
raised a question at trial about whether—at the time of using force against the 
batterer (or the person mistaken to be the batterer)—the defendant reasonably 
believed such force was necessary to deal with an imminent threat posed by the 
batterer.  Battered woman syndrome or battered child syndrome was relevant to 
determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in each of these cases, 
where a “snapshot” summary of the moment of the defendant’s use of force 
would fail to reveal the complexity of continuing incidents of battering that 
culminated in the defendant using force against the batterer. 
By analogy with the battered woman syndrome cases, law enforcement 
officers may be justified in taking into account the events that occurred in the 
time leading up to their interrogation of a suspected terrorist.  For example, the 
public safety exception would likely have applied if terrorism suspects were 
apprehended and interrogated in the days immediately following the attacks that 
the radical Islamist organization al-Qaeda launched against targets in the United 
States on September 11, 2001 (9/11)—which left thousands dead149— because 
the authorities could reasonably anticipate follow-up attacks by al-Qaeda or 
similar groups.  On the morning of 9/11, al-Qaeda operatives hijacked several 
passenger airliners, crashing them into the two towers of the World Trade Center 
in New York City and a wall of the Pentagon (headquarters of the U.S. military) 
in Washington, D.C.150  Another hijacked airplane crashed in a field in rural 
Pennsylvania, apparently as a result of passengers fighting against the 
hijackers.151  By that time, the Federal Aviation Administration had stopped 
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flight operations at airports throughout the country.152  In total, more than 3,000 
people died in the incidents, and approximately 10,000 were wounded.153  If any 
suspects had been apprehended during what appeared to be the commission of 
further terrorist activities in the days immediately following 9/11, law 
enforcement officers would probably have been in the sort of “kaleidoscopic” 
situation that the Quarles Court found demands immediate response and justifies 
use of the public safety exception.154  Just as battered woman syndrome is a form 
of post-traumatic stress disorder and can be relevant to determining whether use 
of force against the batterer was based on a reasonable belief that the batterer 
presented an imminent danger,155 the trauma caused by events such as the 9/11 
attacks could reasonably be factored into the assessment of whether the public 
safety exception applies. 
A series of smaller-scale terrorist incidents might also constitute a situation in 
which law enforcement would be justified in using the public safety exception.  
Consider hypothetical scenario A, in which ten terrorist strikes against the 
United States occurred in the four months immediately preceding apprehension 
of a suspect and each of those incidents resulted in dozens of casualties.  That 
background would tend to render reasonable the arresting officers’ belief that 
there is an immediate necessity to obtain information from the suspect in order 
to protect the public from additional pending attack, because—as in a battered 
woman syndrome situation—the separate attacks can be seen as a continuous 
cycle of violence, thus justifying anticipation of further violence. 
In contrast, consider hypothetical scenario B, in which no major terrorist 
incident has occurred in the United States for several years.  Those 
circumstances would tend to refute law enforcement agents’ claims that they 
reasonably believed it was immediately necessary to interrogate the suspect to 
protect the public from further attacks.  Thus, in determining whether officers 
had a reasonable belief that there was an immediate necessity to obtain 
information by interrogating the suspect without first administering Miranda 
warnings, the severity and frequency of incidents leading up to the most recent 
event are relevant. 
In addition, by analogy with drug dealer cases, a suspect’s activity in a group 
that is known to engage in terrorism might also be relevant to determine whether 
the public safety exception applies.  In United States v. Reyes,156 the court found 
the public safety exception applied because the arresting officer reasonably 
believed that the suspect—a heroin dealer—might be “carrying sharp objects or 
firearms,” as such objects are known to be used by drug dealers.157  Similarly, 
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in United States v. Edwards,158 the public safety exception justified a detective’s 
question about whether the suspect had a gun because “drug dealers are known 
to arm themselves, particularly when making a sale, in order to protect 
themselves, their goods and the large quantities of cash often associated with 
such transactions.”159 
The nature of a suspect’s participation in a group that authorities have 
designated a terrorist organization may likewise be considered a factor in 
determining whether the public safety exception applies.  Although not 
explicitly on point with this interpretation, the federal Second Circuit case  
United States v. Khalil160 is at least suggestive.  In Khalil, an informant told 
police about two suspects who had pipe bombs that they planned to explode 
soon; the suspects were motivated by political events in Palestine.161  Police 
raided the suspects’ apartment, wounded both suspects during their 
apprehension, handcuffed them, and took them to a hospital.162  The police then 
noticed that some switches had been flipped on one of the pipe bombs, and other 
officers conducted un-Mirandized questioning about that with one of the 
suspects at the hospital.163  The suspect answered the questions about the bombs, 
and he “was also asked whether he had planned to kill himself in the explosion, 
to which he responded simply, ‘Poof.’”164  After Miranda warnings were given, 
the suspect was questioned again, and he stated that “he had made the bombs, 
‘want[ing] to blow up a train and kill as many Jews as possible’ because he 
opposed United States support for Israel” and he gave details about the plan.165  
He also asserted his association with Hamas, which the court identified as “a 
terrorist organization.”166 
The suspect challenged the trial court’s admission of his answer of “poof” in 
response to the officers’ question about whether he meant to kill himself in the 
intended bombing.167  However, the Second Circuit found that the public safety 
exception applied because the question “had the potential for shedding light on 
the bomb’s stability.”168 
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The Second Circuit’s mention of Hamas as “a terrorist organization”169 
implied that a suspect’s status as an operative of such a group might help to 
establish conditions for application of the public safety exception.170  That 
implication became more explicit in United States v. Abdulmutallab,171 in which 
one of the factors that justified applying the public safety exception was that the 
suspect’s activities were “on behalf of al-Qaeda.”172  Deciding to delay Miranda 
warnings based on a suspect’s affiliation with a particular group might raise 
concerns about First Amendment protections for freedom of speech and freedom 
of association.173  But judges have found no violation of those First Amendment 
provisions in another context addressing support for terrorist organizations—
namely, legislative prohibitions on funding for terrorist groups.174  Similarly, 
First Amendment rights of free speech and freedom of association might also be 
undisturbed by questioning aimed at protecting the public safety—prompted in 
part by the suspect’s activity in an organization that government agencies have 
named a terrorist group. 
Although not an exact match, some correlation can be made between the three 
phases asserted in battered woman syndrome theory and some general stages of 
terrorist activity.  The “tension-building” phase of battered woman syndrome, 
characterized by danger signals foreshadowing a violent episode,175 suggests a 
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comparison to increases in “terrorist chatter,”176 terrorist group communications 
observed by government intelligence agencies.  Of course, the “acute-explosion” 
phase of battered woman syndrome, in which violent episodes occur,177 is 
analogous to an actualized terrorist incident such as occurred in the 9/11 attacks.  
Battered woman syndrome’s “loving, contrition” phase, during which the 
batterer expresses remorse and promises better behavior in the future,178 does 
not have an exact correspondence to a stage of terrorist activity; however, both 
individual victims of batterers and nation-state victims of terrorism may 
experience periods of calm within an ongoing cycle of recurring violence.  
Battered woman syndrome thus offers insights into situations of self-defense that 
might be useful in determining whether, by analogy, the public safety exception 
should apply to law enforcement agents’ questioning of suspected terrorists. 
IV.  INVOCATION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION DURING INVESTIGATIONS 
OF RECENT TERRORISM INCIDENTS HAS BEEN JUSTIFIED—SOMETIMES 
This section examines and critiques the way that the public safety exception 
has been invoked during interrogation of suspects in some of the most highly 
publicized terrorism cases in recent years.  Considerations include the scope of 
questioning, the presence or absence of information linking the suspect to 
terrorist groups, and whether the suspect actually invoked his rights. 
A.  The “Underwear Bomber” a.k.a. “Christmas Day Bomber” 
In August of 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab journeyed to Yemen to 
participate in the activities of a group affiliated with al-Qaeda.179  He agreed to 
perpetrate a suicide bombing that would take place on an airplane in U.S. 
airspace.180  On December 25, 2009, Abdulmutallab boarded a flight to go from 
Amsterdam to Detroit while wearing a non-metal bomb (that could slip past 
airport security) in his underwear.181  But when Abdulmutallab attempted to 
detonate the bomb as the airplane approached Detroit, the effect was smaller 
than he anticipated: 
The result was a single, loud pop, which other passengers described as 
sounding like a firecracker.  The explosive device did not work as 
intended, and caused only a large fireball around Abdulmutallab and 
then a fire coming out of Abdulmutallab’s pants, igniting the 
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carpeting, walls, and seat.  A number of passengers restrained 
Abdulmutallab and attempted to put the fire out.182 
After the airplane landed, Abdulmutallab was transported to a hospital for 
treatment of his injuries.183 
At the hospital, an FBI agent questioned Abdulmutallab for approximately 
fifty minutes.184  The agent knew the circumstances of Abdulmutallab having 
tried to detonate the bomb.185  Those facts—not just the circumstances that 
existed at the time the suspect was hospitalized—were contemplated by the 
federal District Court when considering the suspect’s motion to suppress the 
statements he made in response to the interrogation at the hospital.186  As argued 
above, this sort of use of the suspect’s past actions bears a striking resemblance 
to contemplating a batterer’s course of conduct in deciding whether a sufferer of 
battered woman syndrome reasonably took action in self-defense.  The 
investigating agents also knew of the suspect’s “self-proclaimed association 
with al-Qaeda and . . . the group’s past history of large, coordinated plots and 
attacks,” and so they “feared that there could be additional, imminent aircraft 
attacks in the United States and elsewhere in the world.”187  The questioning at 
the hospital was aimed at uncovering “where [the suspect] traveled, when he had 
traveled, how, and with whom; the details of the explosive device; the details 
regarding the bomb-maker, including where [the suspect] had received the 
bomb; his intentions in attacking Flight 253; and who else might be planning an 
attack.”188  The court ruled that the public safety exception applied,189 finding 
that “[e]very question sought to identify any other potential attackers and to 
prevent another potential attack,” and that the suspect’s responses provided 
“information that helped the agents to determine where to go next and 
investigate if anyone else might be planning to or was already in the process of 
carrying a similar device on an aircraft.”190 
Because of the risk of further impending attacks, the nature of the questions 
asked at the hospital, especially those inquiring about the bomb and the 
possibility of additional incidents of similar devices being carried onto airplanes, 
could be justified as having been—in the language of Quarles—“reasonably 
prompted by a concern for the public safety.”191  In further compliance with the 
scope of the public safety exception, after the agents who questioned 
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Abdulmutallab obtained enough information to protect the public, they 
“concluded their interview and immediately passed that information on to other 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies worldwide, further underscoring that 
it was obtained for purposes of public safety, to deal with other possible 
threats.”192 
Before the suspect’s trial could reach the point at which his un-Mirandized 
statements would have been introduced into evidence, he entered a plea of guilty 
to various terrorism charges and related crimes and was sentenced to four terms 
of life imprisonment, three terms of imprisonment for 240 months, and one term 
of imprisonment for thirty years.193 
B.  The “Times Square Bomber” 
In the early evening of May 1, 2010,194 a vehicle parked at the curb in Times 
Square, New York City with “its engine running and its hazard lights on” began 
to emit smoke.195  The vehicle contained a bomb consisting of “three propane 
tanks, two gallons of petrol and a load of fertilizer, with fireworks and some 
cheap alarm clocks as a trigger.”196  The vehicle contained “more than 100 
pounds of fertilizer, but not the kind that would explode.”197  Apparently, the 
would-be bomber mistakenly used the wrong type of fertilizer; if the same type 
that was “used by Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh” had been present 
in the vehicle in Times Square, then it “would have had the force of more than 
100 pounds of TNT.”198 
Just over fifty-three hours after the bomb failed to detonate,199 investigators 
went to New York’s John F. Kennedy Airport and arrested the suspect, Faisal 
Shahzad, as he was onboard an airplane that was scheduled to depart for 
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Dubai.200  Shahzad is a U.S. citizen originally from Pakistan.201  Soon after his 
arrest in New York, Pakistani government authorities “detained 13 people in 
their [concurrent] investigation of the attempted [Times Square] bombing.”202  
On May 5, 2010, “Pakistan’s foreign minister . . . claimed the failed bomb attack 
in Times Square could be a direct response to US action against the Taliban.”203 
Shahzad was initially questioned without Miranda warnings.204  Reports do 
not indicate how much time was involved in that initial interrogation.  
Prosecutors stated that Shahzad later “was advised of and waived his Miranda 
rights to remain silent.”205  Shahzad was reported to have “extensively 
cooperated with authorities, providing many hours of information”206 in the 
nearly two weeks that elapsed between his arrest and his meeting with a 
lawyer.207  However, according to a reporter, Shahzad claimed during his 
sentencing hearing that “‘[o]n the second day of [his] arrest, [he] asked for the 
Miranda [sic],’ . . . referring to the required notification of his right to 
counsel.”208  He further told the court that “‘the F.B.I. denied it to [him] for two 
weeks’ and threatened his wife and children.”209  But during the hearing, no one 
responded to Shahzad’s allegations, and his attorney “had no comment on the 
statements after the hearing.”210 
At some point in response to the questioning conducted by law enforcement, 
Shahzad told investigators that during a return visit to Pakistan, he received 
training in the use of explosives with the group Tehrik-e-Taliban, which is “a 
militant extremist group.”211  That group is on the U.S. Department of State’s 
list of foreign terrorist organizations.212  While pleading guilty to “a 10-count 
indictment” encompassing several terrorism-related charges, Shahzad 
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condemned the presence of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as 
well as the use of “unmanned drone strikes against terror suspects.”213 
Initial un-Mirandized questioning of Shahzad appears to be justified in light 
of the threat that his bomb could have created for the residents of New York 
City.  Especially in light of Abdulmutallab’s “underwear bombing” attempt just 
a few months before that, and Abdulmutallab’s confessed link to the terrorist 
group al-Qaeda, authorities could plausibly perceive a need to question Shahzad 
to discover the scale of any similar plot in the Times Square incident.  For 
sufferers of battered woman syndrome, recent attacks heighten the perception of 
warning signs pointing to further attacks;214 a similar perception could justify a 
sense of a need for immediate information to deal with a series of terrorism 
incidents.  However, Shahzad’s allegation that agents denied his request for a 
lawyer and threatened his family215 is troubling.  The public safety exception 
simply does not allow investigators to continue questioning a suspect in spite of 
his request for a lawyer,216 and no legal doctrine justifies threatening a suspect’s 
family in order to obtain his compliance during questioning.  Thus, if Shahzad’s 
claims about the interrogation were found to be credible, then his statements 
made in response to being denied a lawyer and his family being threatened would 
have been inadmissible for his criminal trial.  However, the absence of comment 
by anyone at the hearing—including Shahzad’s attorney217—does not lend 
credibility to his claims.  Rather than go to trial, Shahzad pleaded guilty to 
federal terrorism charges and related crimes, with resulting judgments of six life 
terms, two ten-year terms, and two twenty-year terms.218 
C.  The Boston Marathon Bombing219 
On the afternoon of April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded along the final 
section of the Boston Marathon course.220  Investigators found “that the bombs 
were probably fashioned from pressure cookers, filled with nails and ball 
bearings to increase the carnage.”221  The bombing killed three people and 
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wounded more than 260 others.222  Based on video recordings of the crowd at 
the marathon, the FBI released photographs of two suspects who turned out to 
be brothers Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.223  During a shootout on April 
19, 2013, Tamerlan (the older brother) was killed and Dzhokhar was wounded; 
Dzhokhar was eventually arrested that evening.224  Apparently, Dzhokhar had 
written a note along the wall of a boat where he hid from authorities before his 
arrest; a news source described it as “part manifesto, part suicide note and part 
justification for the killing and maiming of innocent civilians.”225  A media 
source stated that the boat message was “scrawled with a marker on the interior 
wall of the cabin” and “said the bombings were retribution for U.S. military 
action in Afghanistan and Iraq, and called the Boston victims ‘collateral damage’ 
in the same way Muslims have been in the American-led wars.”226  Dzhokhar 
received emergency surgery for his wounds on the same day he was 
apprehended,227 and the government announced that he would be interrogated 
without being advised of his Miranda rights.228 
The interrogation took place during April 20‒22.229  Including time for breaks, 
the questioning was conducted for more than twenty-seven hours.230  Dzhokhar 
was unable to speak because of his injuries and surgery, so he wrote his answers 
to the agents’ questions.231  According to the defense, his written responses 
stated that there were no additional bombs, and he made repeated requests for 
rest and for a lawyer, writing “the word ‘lawyer’ ten times, sometimes circling 
it.”232  The FBI report of the interview indicates that Dzhokhar was told he 
needed to answer questions before he would be allowed to speak with a lawyer, 
in order “to ensure that the public safety was no longer in danger from other 
individuals, devices, or otherwise.”233  The defense also stated that “[t]he FBI 
report and notes make[] it clear that the interrogation was wide-ranging, 
covering everything from how and where the bombs were made to his beliefs 
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about Islam and U.S. foreign policy, as well as his sports activities, future career 
goals, and school history.”234  During interrogation, Dzhokhar disclosed to law 
enforcement agents that in the aftermath of the Boston Marathon bombing, he 
and his brother had decided to drive to New York City to bomb Times Square.235 
Finally, the day after the first criminal charges were filed in the case, a federal 
magistrate judge presented the charges to Dzhokhar Tsarnaev in the hospital and 
gave him the Miranda warnings.236  By that time, he “had been in custody for 
more than 60 hours,” which is reportedly the longest period for a criminal 
suspect to be held without being advised of his Miranda rights.237  He “stopped 
speaking as soon as his rights were read to him.”238 
The prosecution eventually filed a total of thirty counts of federal terrorism 
charges and related crimes against Dzhokhar.239  In response to the defendant’s 
motion to suppress the statements made in the hospital, the prosecution stated 
that “[i]n light of the history of coordinated terrorist attacks (and planned 
attacks) such as the ones in Mumbai, India, Times Square, the New York subway 
system, and on September 11, the FBI had a duty to be investigate [sic] whether 
any additional attacks were imminent.”240  This framing of the scope of the 
problem—examining a series of past incidents of violence (and attempted 
violence) in order to justify recent action taken against the perpetrator of the 
incidents—bears a striking resemblance to the use of battered woman syndrome 
in the context of self-defense, as described above. 
The case docket shows that in spite of initially opposing the defendant’s 
motion to suppress the use of his un-Mirandized statements, the prosecution later 
indicated it would not use Dzhokhar’s statements; as a result, the District Court 
dismissed without prejudice the defendant’s motion for suppression of the 
statements.241  However, if the prosecution had tried to introduce into evidence 
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the statements that Dzhokhar wrote when he was interrogated in the hospital, a 
couple of matters should have rendered at least some of those statements 
inadmissible. 
First, the wide-ranging interrogation went beyond what is allowed under the 
public safety exception.  Pursuant to Quarles, the public safety exception applies 
only when there is an immediate necessity to obtain information to protect the 
officers or the public.242  As noted above, an internal memorandum of the FBI 
states that the public safety exception justifies inquiries such as “questions about 
possible impending or coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature, and 
threat posed by weapons that might post [sic] an imminent danger to the public; 
and the identities, locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may 
be plotting additional imminent attacks.”243  Answers to the questions that agents 
asked about the bombs that the Tsarnaev brothers used might have been 
admissible if the prosecution could show that the information was relevant to 
determining whether they had left other bombs that posed an immediate threat 
to the public.  However, the questions regarding Dzhokhar’s views “about Islam 
and U.S. foreign policy, as well as his sports activities, future career goals, and 
school history”244 do not relate to an immediate threat, so the public safety 
exception would not have made his answers on those topics admissible for the 
prosecution’s use at trial. 
Moreover, Tsarnaev invoked his right to a lawyer even before he was 
Mirandized.  As the defense correctly observed, the Supreme Court has not 
authorized continued questioning of a suspect after he has invoked his right to 
counsel.245  Instead, in Edwards v. Arizona,246 the Court held that “an accused, . 
. . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is 
not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made 
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, 
exchanges, or conversations with the police.”247  Furthermore, the circumstances 
of Dzhokhar’s interrogation match those described in the pre-Miranda case of 
Escobedo v. Illinois,248 in which the Supreme Court found the police committed 
a violation of the Sixth Amendment when they questioned a suspect, refused his 
request to speak with his lawyer, and did not advise him of his right to remain 
silent.249  The Escobedo Court thus ruled that the statements the suspect made to 
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the police during the interrogation were not admissible against him at the 
subsequent criminal trial.250 
Neither Quarles nor other Supreme Court opinions permit continued 
interrogation after a suspect requests a lawyer.251  The public safety exception—
when it applies at all—allows only for a delay in informing a suspect of his 
Miranda rights.252  As discussed above in connection with the case of Edwards, 
the authorities are not permitted to violate rights that the suspect has actually 
invoked.253  The Boston Marathon bombing prosecutors nevertheless argued at 
first that the statements obtained during Tsarnaev’s interrogation were 
admissible pursuant to the federal Ninth Circuit case of United States v. 
DeSantis254 and its subsequent line of decisions.255  In the DeSantis case, the 
court held that the public safety exception applied to questioning about the 
location of weapons in the suspect’s apartment, even if the suspect had “asked 
to call his lawyer as soon as the inspectors entered the apartment,” and the police 
did not permit him to do so.256  However, the DeSantis court relied on the 
Quarles Court’s characterization of the Miranda rule as a mere “prophylactic” 
measure to protect criminal suspects’ rights.257  As explained above, the 
subsequent Supreme Court case of Dickerson held that Miranda had announced 
a Constitutional rule, not merely prophylactic guidelines.258  Thus, the 
prosecution’s reliance on the DeSantis line of cases is rather dubious, and any 
answers that Dzhokhar gave in response to questions that were asked after he 
first requested a lawyer would probably have been inadmissible at trial.259 
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On April 8, 2015, the jury convicted Dzhokar on all thirty counts of which he 
was charged, and on May 15, 2015, the jury delivered its verdict of the death 
penalty.260 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In creating the public safety exception to the Miranda rule, the Supreme Court 
drew an implicit analogy between the criminal procedure role of police during 
interrogation of suspects under dangerous circumstances and the role of criminal 
defendants utilizing justifications of self-defense and defense of others.  The 
comparison is especially instructive when applied to cases involving the 
interrogation of terrorism suspects.  Just as battered woman syndrome can 
extend the range of circumstances in which the self-defense doctrine applies, a 
recent history of heightened terrorist activity could extend the breadth of the 
public safety exception at a particular time; conversely, a recent history of 
reduced terrorist activity could diminish the breadth of the public safety 
exception for a particular period. 
In considering claims of self-defense based on battered woman syndrome, a 
crucial focus is whether the defendant reasonably believed that the batterer 
presented an imminent danger based on the history of violence that the batterer 
had perpetrated upon the defendant.261  The trauma experienced by the defendant 
has a bearing on the reasonableness of the defendant’s perception of imminent 
danger.262 
Similarly, the applicability of the public safety exception depends on whether 
law enforcement agents could reasonably believe that there was an immediate 
necessity to protect themselves or the public from danger posed by the suspect 
or the suspect’s possible accomplices.263  In terrorism cases, that inquiry can take 
into account the recent history of terrorist activities—which has a bearing on the 
extent to which “our body politic has been traumatized”264—and its influence on 
the reasonableness of believing that un-Mirandized questioning is needed to deal 
with an immediate threat to the safety of law enforcement officers and the 
general public. 
Thus, both self-defense under conditions of battered woman syndrome and 
the public safety exception under conditions of terrorist threat can invoke 
                                                          
 260. Jury Verdict, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 8, 2015); 
Milton J. Valencia, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Gets Death Penalty for Placing Marathon Bomb, BOSTON 
GLOBE (May 15, 2015),  http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-death 
-penalty-sentencing-jury-boston-marathon-bombing/canMEfLmeQJxQ4rFU0sERJ/story.html?ho 
otPostID=585e84a4950b0618fd31dbded2dcaf0c; Michael McLaughlin, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 
Sentenced to Death, HUFFINGTON POST (May 15, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2015/05/15/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-sentenced_n_7283680.html?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=Politics. 
 261. Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000). 
 262. Id. 
 263. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56 (1984). 
 264. I am indebted to Professor Sue Liemer for this phrasing. 
2015] Mirandizing Terrorism Suspects? 647 
dynamic histories of violent interaction, rather than relying on a static 
“snapshot” view of a single moment in time.  Applying this perspective offers 
courts that may be struggling to come to terms with the boundaries of the public 
safety exception in terrorism cases the guidance of the defined and developed 
body of law addressing battered woman syndrome. 
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